
#### **ECCSs**

- Emergency core cooling systems
- Designed to prevent core meltdown
- Crucial when Sizewell B inquiry passed
- Provided for EPR emergency cooling
- Not applied at TMI 2, operators fooled
- Started, but failed by Fukushima SBO
- Needed when component fails
- Concept is to inject water into RV after part depressurised to cool core

### **EPR**



### Reactor vessel (RV)

- Contains core and control rods
- EPR RV has 8 inlet/outlet connections to 4 steam generators and a pressuriser
- EPR Pressure/Temperature 15.5 Mpa/328°C
- PWRs have steam generators (SGs); BWRs have none.
- EPR has 89 CRDM mechanisms mounted on RV head to drive 89 control rods

### Core meltdowns

- TMI 2 Partial core meltdown
- No available feed pumps; stuck relief valve; operators failed to apply ECCS
- Fukushima 1, 2 and 3 had full meltdowns in station blackout (SBO)
- Cooling water failed after start; cores melted through RV's bottoms
- Control rods applied; but decay heat enough to melt cores

John Busby

#### TMI 2

- Reserve feed pumps down for maintenance; working pumps failed
- RV pressure rose, opened relief valve which stuck open; led to depressurisation
- HP hot water flashed to steam/water mix
- Steam/water mix level rose; operators thought core covered; partial melt of core.
- H2 explosion retained by containment

#### **Fukushima**

- Fukushima Diachii; 6 BWRs 3 working
- Control rods driven up from bottom in earthquake; reactors shut down
- Emergency cooling stops with SBO; steam turbine pumps stopped when batteries ran down; service auxiliaries, controls and lighting failed.
- Decay heat raised pressure in RVs; when relieved caused H2 explosion; service floor gone, full core melting

### Hydrogen generation

- RV contains water at high pressure and temperature
- Venting turns water into steam
- Heat transfer from fuel cans to water water/steam mix poor
- Fuel cans heat up ion exchange zirconium/steam -> hydrogen
- Hydrogen leaves RV into containment

# Hydrogen explodes

- Can surface 1000°C 2000°C
- Generated hydrogen leaves at more than auto-ignition temperature of 585°C
- Explosive  $H_2$ /air mix 18.3% 59%
- Once the mix is between limits it explodes
- TMI 2 containment held; will EPR's
- Fukushima 1 and 3 service floors destroyed.

### Why the EPR ECCSs can't work

- RV pressure needs to fall by half for emergency cooling water to enter; accumulator and pump pressure just 8 MPa; RV has to be depressurised below this.
- The depressurisation leads immediately to flashing, coolant volume expands preventing emergency water entering
- Venting flashes hot water to steam, can surface heats, hydrogen generated, explodes in air
- Steam/H<sub>2</sub> leaving stops water ingress
- Uncooled core melts, if full melt it goes through bottom of RV to corum catcher

# EPR design

- Double concrete containment plus corum catcher
- Massive civil engineering
- Unaffordably expensive construction needed to cater for an ECCS that can't work
- Radioactivity contained, but EPR lost